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Hungary has been a front-runner in the transition to capitalism. It has
also experienced exceptionally radical changes in employment and
relative wages. One main feature of these changes is an enormous in-
crease in the returns to skill. This paper argues that it is instructive to
divide the process into two periods, divided by around the year 1995.
The first period experienced major destruction of low-skilled jobs and
large inter-sectoral reallocation, partly toward skill-intensive indus-
tries. Employment started to rebound in the second period, which has
also seen a pervasive skill upgrade in all sectors. The skill premium in
earnings started to grow even faster in the second stage because in-
creasing demand for skill met a more and more inelastic supply in the
short run. Long-run supply effects have been, however, strong as col-
lege enrollment rates soared. Introduction of new (foreign) capital
seems to be a major factor behind increasing demand for skill. Foreign
direct investment into Hungary was by far the largest among the tran-
sition countries until the late 1990’s, but other Central-Eastern Euro-
pean countries started to catch up since. This suggests that the Hun-
garian experience might be helpful to predict labor market trends in
other transition economies, especially those that attract significant for-
eign capital.2
A MUNKAERŐPIACI TRANZÍCIÓ KÉT FÁZISA MAGYARORSZÁGON:
INTERSZEKTORÁLIS REALLOKÁCIÓ ÉS A KÉPESSÉGEKET
FELÉRTÉKELŐ TECHNOLÓGIAI VÁLTOZÁS
 KÉZDI GÁBOR
A munkaerőpiaci változásokat tekintve Magyarország a legradikális-
abb átmeneti gazdaságok közé tartozik. Különösen igaz ez az iskolai
végzettséggel összefüggő foglalkoztatási és kereseti egyenlőtlenségek
terén: az iskola hozadéka rendkívüli mértékben megnőtt. Az alábbi ta-
nulmány amellett érvel, hogy a folyamatokat érdemes két külön sza-
kaszra osztani, amelyeket 1995 körül választhatunk ketté. Az első sza-
kaszt az alacsony képzettséget igénylő munkahelyek tömeges megszün-
tetése és rendkívüli mértékű ágazatok közötti reallokaió jellemezte. Ez
utóbbi részben magasabb képzettséget igényő ágazatok felé is irányult.
A második szakaszban a foglalkoztatás csökkenése megállt, és minden
ágazaton belül megfigyelhetjük a magasabb képzettségűek arányának
növekedését. Az iskola bérekben mért hozadéka a második periódusban
még gyorsabban nőtt, valószínűleg a rövid távon rugalmatlan kínálat
miatt. Hosszú távon azonban erősek a kínálati reakciók, amit a megu-
gró egyetemi-főiskolai beiskolázások mutatnak. A külföldi tőkének
jelentős szerepe volt az iskola hozadékának emelkedésében. Minthogy
Magyarország a 90-es évek végéig élenjárt a külföldi tőkebefektetések
terén, a hazai munkaerőpiaci trendek segíthetnek a többi, később pri-
vatizáló átmeneti gazdaság helyzetének előrejelzéséhez.3
Hungary has been one of the most successful countries in transforming its
economy from state socialism to modern capitalism. It also experienced the
largest decline in employment until the second half of the 1990’s (Svejnar,
2002). Trends in employment were highly correlated with educational at-
tainment. At the same time, returns to skill have increased substantially in
terms of earnings. These trends affected all cohorts but the real winners are
the young well educated.
1
In this paper I try to identify the major factors behind these trends. In
particular, my question is how much of the changes is specific to transition
and how much is a result of worldwide skill-biased technological change.
Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998) document similar trends in the devel-
oped world, with a lot smaller magnitude. They argue that the most plausi-
ble explanation for those trends is skill-biased changes in technology,
which affected all manufacturing industries and all developed countries.
The evidence suggests that demand for skill increased dramatically in
Hungary. Doubtless, many factors were responsible for this phenomenon.
Price liberalization and restructuring of international trade had dramati-
cally changed the structure of product demand. Free entrepreneurship and
the rule of law had encouraged business in all sectors, especially in serv-
ices. Capital has been scarce in transition economies, but foreign capital
started to flow in. Part of foreign investment involved setting up new com-
panies but privatization of existing companies was equally important. De-
spite widespread deregulation, competition in some industries remained
low often for political reasons, which allowed non-competitive behavior to
survive. All of these factors had potential impact on the demand for skill.
Skill-biased technological change, whether induced by new foreign capital
or domestic innovation, is therefore one of many possible factors behind
changing labor demand.
I will argue that probably all the above factors played an important role in
the first years of transition. However, Hungary entered a second phase that
can be well described by pervasive skill-biased technological change
alone. A large inter-sector reallocation of employment took place in the
first period, partly towards skill-intensive industries. At the same time,
most industries upgraded their skill composition either by firing the low
skilled or selective hiring. In the second period, industrial reallocation did
not add to the overall increase in skill intensity. Skill upgrading has been
                                           
1 See section 2 for more details.4
pervasive since the mid-1990’s but it has slowed down. At the same time,
the skill premium accelerated substantially. The available evidence sug-
gests that after 1995, increasing demand for skill met a quite inelastic sup-
ply in the short run. On the other hand, the dramatic changes had a strong
effect on the long-run supply of skilled labor: college enrollment rates
soared. I show evidence that introduction of new (foreign) capital has been
a major factor behind increasing demand for skill ever since the early
1990’s. Its effects could become overwhelming partly because the other ef-
fects diminished, and partly because foreign ownership grew substantial.
I utilize a large body of data for the analysis, from household surveys,
wages surveys, and firm balances linked to individual earnings data. Sec-
tion 1 describes the data. In section 2, I provide a very brief overview of
the main trends and establish the dominant role of labor demand (as op-
posed to labor supply) in a formal analysis. I also identify the two phases
of transition and show how the two periods differ in terms of supply and
demand shifts. In the third part I analyze changes in the industrial compo-
sition of labor demand and establish the pervasive nature of skill upgrade
after 1995. In the fourth section I estimate reduced-from earnings equa-
tions on matched employer-employee data in order to disentangle the pos-
sible forces behind the skill premium. The last part concludes.
1.D a t a
There are several large surveys in Hungary that can help answering our
questions. On the other hand, each contains only parts of the necessary in-
formation. For some of the analyses in the paper that partial information is
enough. For others I combined aggregates from different sources, for com-
parable groups.
The analysis of employment data is based on cross-sectional household
surveys, for years 1987, 1989, and yearly from 1992; wage (after-tax
earnings) data from establishment-based but individual level wage surveys,
for years 1986, 1989, 1992, and yearly form 1994. I use firm- and industry-
level variables based on balance sheet information. These data are linked
to the individual earnings data and are available for varying periods, most
of them starting at 1992 but not available for 1996. For descriptive analysis
and to answer demand-supply questions, I analyze repeated cross-sections
of employment (from the household surveys) and earnings (from the Wage
Surveys), aggregated by gender, age, and education. The same household5
survey data are used for analyzing changes in industrial skill composition.
For analyzing the relationship between returns to skill, firm and industry
characteristics I use cross-sectional samples of the individual wage surveys
with linked firm and industry information.
2
I define skill in two ways: nonmanual occupations and the two higher
levels of education, 12 grades (baccalaureate) and college (or more). Most
results are robust to the choice of the skill group, with natural differences:
effects are strongest for college educated, weakest for those with 12
grades, and nonmanual workers show an average. In most of the paper I
emphasize the results for the college educated.
3 Other measurement issues
will be addressed along the analysis.
                                           
2 In terms of data sources, the paper makes use of five different surveys. These are the
following. (1) The 1988 Household Income Survey Hungarian of the Central
Statistical Office (CSO); it provides us with detailed employment data for the year
1987. (2) The 1990 Census provides us with participation, unemployment and self-
employment data for the year 1989. Note that neither (1) nor (2) measure
unemployment in a standard way. That is not an issue for 1987 as unemployment was
non-existent those days, but the 1989 figures are susceptible to the problem. (3) From
1992 on, the CSO has been conducting a Labor Force Survey on a quarterly basis.
Among other things, this survey contains standard measures of participation and
unemployment, but it does not contain any information about earnings. I use the
annual series of the Quarter 2 surveys because those are comparable in timing with
the wage data (see next) and they suffer the least from seasonal effects. (4) The Wage
Surveys of the National Labor Center provide us with the earnings data from 1986,
1989, 1992, and yearly from 1994 to 1999. The data are collected from the employers
and they cover only wage/salary employees who work at firms with more than 10
employees (20 before 1995). (5) Firm and industry-level data from firm balance
sheets with capital, labor utilization, revenues and ownership information, matched
to the Wage Survey data. For more detailed description of the data see Ábrahám and
Kézdi (2000), Halpern and Kőrösi (2000) and Kertesi and Köllő (1999 and 2001a). I
thank Gyula Nagy for the most recent Labor Force Surveys, Gábor Kertesi and János
Köllő for the Wage Surveys, and Gábor Kőrösi for the firm and industry-level data.
3 The Hungarian education system is based on an 8-grade elementary school, a 3-grade
vocational or 4-grade high-school training (11 and 12 grades, respectively), followed
by college and university degrees. In 1999, 55% of the 30-34 years old completed 0-
11 degrees of education, 31% had 12 degrees, and 14% had college or more. The
same figures for the 55–59 years old are 65%, 22%, and 13%. Socialist Hungary had
been successful in increasing the level education up to the 12
th grade but not further.
Since this paper focuses on the increasing returns to skill, differences among the
unskilled will not be analyzed: the 0–-11 grades group will not be disaggregated.6
2. General trends: falling employment and increasing demand for
skill
2.1 Employment
Total employment in Hungary decreased from 4.8 million in 1987 to 3.5
million in 1996. It increased to 3.7 million by 1999, as shown in Table 1.
Virtually all the jobs were lost by the least educated. Between 1987 and
1996, employment of those with 11 grades or less fell from 3,1 to 1,9 mil-
lion (-38%), compared to 1,17 to 1,09 million (-7%) for those with 12
grades, and 0,56 to 0,54 million (-5%) for the college educated. All (net)
job destruction took place outside public administration, health, and edu-
cation. Employment outside those sectors fell from 4 million in 1987 to 2.7
million in 1995, which meant one third of all jobs destroyed.
Figure 1 shows trends in labor market participation (employment + un-
employment), employment, wage/salary employment (basically employ-
ment – self-employment), and full-time wage/salary employment rates, in
the three education groups, among the 15–59 years old.
4 Not only changes
in employment but changes in self-employment and part-time work are
also correlated with education. The number of self-employed (not
wage/salary employment) decreased for the less educated while increased
substantially for the college educated, and the same is true for part-time
employment.
The adjustment to dropping employment took place through both un-
employment and nonparticipation. National unemployment rate rose from
zero to 14 per cent by 1993 and declined to 8 per cent in 1999. Nonpartici-
pation lags unemployment, which suggests that part of it is passive long-
term unemployment. Figure 2 shows the trends in unemployment rate and
nonparticipation rate by education. Again, the three education groups ex-
perienced very different levels. The unemployment rate differences have
been virtually constant throughout the whole period: for those with 0-11
grades of education it has been twice that of people with 12 grades and
five times that of people with 13 or more grades. Differences in nonpar-
ticipation have also been stable between the most and the least educated.
                                           
4 The upper bound of the age range reflects an average of pre-retirement age.
Participation above 60 has been virtually zero, so focusing on the usual 15–74 years
old population gives the same pictures shifted downwards. Those figures are
available upon request.7
At the same time, those with 12 grades started very close to the college
educated but experienced a steady growth in nonparticipation.
2.2 Earnings
An important feature of the transition was a radical drop in the fraction of
wage/salary employment. The early 1990’s saw an enormous increase in
self-employment and small company ownership, especially among the
most educated. By the late 1990’s non-wage employment among the less
educated dropped behind pre-transition levels but remained high for the
more educated. Incorporating oneself has been possible since the new legal
framework for businesses of 1989, and it has become a popular way to
avoid taxes and social security contributions. Although it was not feasible
for all occupations, the large increase in the fraction of non-wage earners
among the most educated, and especially among prime age college-
educated men, implies a widespread phenomenon.
The benefits of incorporating oneself have been higher the more pro-
ductive one was (probably in a progressive way), whereas the costs have
been fairly fixed (or at least regressive). Therefore, higher productivity
earners became self-employed or owners of small businesses with a higher
probability. This phenomenon is unfortunate not only for government
revenues but also for our empirical analysis. The earnings data we have are
representative for the self-selected subpopulation of wage/salary earners in
firms with at least 10 employees. The plausible direction of self-selection
implies that the left-out subpopulation has had higher average earnings,
probably even after controlling for observables. Since the trends differ by
education, we probably underestimate not only skill-related earnings dif-
ferences but also their increase during the 1990’s.
5
Those keeping in mind let us turn to changes in relative earnings. Fig-
ure 3 shows after tax earnings relative to the year-specific average for the
three education groups, by gender. At the aggregate level, earnings of the
college educated rose from 1.4 times the average in 1986 to 1,7 times that
in 1999. At the same time, people with less than 12 grades decreased from
                                           
5 Another possible problem is that wages under the socialist system were not taxed at
the individual level. But we can probably ignore that for our analysis. In Hungary,
personal income tax was introduced in 1987 in such a way that kept after-tax
earnings unchanged for most of the work force. 1986 earnings are therefore
comparable to after-tax earnings later.8
0,9 of the average to 0,7 of that. Returns to skills have increased a lot more
outside public administration, health, and education: the comparable fig-
ures are 1,5 to 2,1 for the college educated. These trends were substantially
more pronounced among men. The slower growth in educated young
women’s relative wage is in large parts due to their large employment in
public services, especially education and health. Outside public admini-
stration, health, and education, college-educated women and men have ex-
perienced more similar earnings growth.
6 Relative earnings of the best-
educated men and women in the private sector soared after 1995, the
starting year of economic recovery in Hungary. Together with slow em-
ployment growth for the group this suggests an increasing demand and a
rather inelastic supply. The results in section 2,3 will show that this phe-
nomenon has dominated the late 1990’s in Hungary.
2.3 Two phases of demand and supply trends
Relative earnings and employment comove in the large demographic
groups I examined in the previous section. Not surprisingly, this implies
that the enormous changes in the Hungarian labor market were driven by
labor demand. In this section I analyze the question in a more formal way.
Such an analysis is valuable also because it allows one to distinguish peri-
ods in which supply and demand changes were different.
In what follows I analyze an aggregate panel for groups defined by age,
gender, and education. Recall that the employment and wage aggregates
come from different sources. Matched aggregates are valid observations
for analysis only if those samples are representative to the groups. If
moreover the survey variables are compatible through time, an aggregate
panel database can be built from the yearly surveys. For more details about
aggregate panel models, see Deaton (1997, Chapter 2). Compatibility of
the variables is a key issue and is especially important when the analyzed
country has witnessed the enormous changes transition economies did.
Ábrahám and Kézdi (2000) address the issue for the datasets analyzed here
and conclude that the data are compatible.
Estimation and statistical inference from the aggregate data is also
complicated because each variable is an estimate itself and is therefore
measured with sampling error. This measurement error is of classical na-
                                           
6 In a different paper (Kézdi, 1999) I have provided a more detailed examined the
relative decline of the skill premium in the government sector.9
ture, and it therefore makes the estimator for β  biased towards zero. The
bias is likely to be severe in first-differenced panel models, because first
differencing reduces variation in the true variables and magnifies the error
variation (this point was first made by Griliches and Hausman, 1981). I de-
rive the approximate bias and estimate it in the Appendix. The results indi-
cate that the measurement error bias is substantial but it does not change
the results qualitatively. Below I present point estimates and standard er-
rors both with and without the bias correction.
By examining year-to-year changes of employment and wages in the
aggregate panel, one can test for positive comovements in these disaggre-
gated demographic groups. Moreover, one can estimate the relationship
within larger groups or shorter periods. Obviously, all we observe are re-
alized price and quantity points, not demand or supply curves. All we can
do, therefore, is to assess whether changes in demand or supply dominated
the market. Positive comovement of prices and quantities implies that the
major factor is changes in demand, while negative comovement implies the
dominance of supply.
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, (1)
where i denotes the observations (5-year age groups ×  gender ×  3 educa-
tion groups), t time, L is employment, P is population, W is monthly after
tax earnings, L and P without i subscripts denote within-year sums, while
p W  is within-year average.
7 β  is a reduced-form elasticity: it measures the
percentage change in relative employment that corresponds to a one per
cent change in relative wages, on average. A negative elasticity indicates
the dominance of supply factors; shifts in the demand curve were of less
importance if any. A positive coefficient implies the importance of demand
factors. Zero elasticity corresponds to no change in employment when
wages change, on average.
8
I estimated the model for the Hungarian labor market for the whole pe-
riod and for 1986–1995 and 1996–1999 separately. The choice of 1995
                                           
7 All variables are measured as yearly changes, so the 1989–1992 log changes were
divided by three, the 1986–1989 log wage changes also by three, the 1987–1989 log
employment changes by two, and the 1992–1994 changes by two.
8 This approach for disentangling supply and demand factors has been standard in
empirical labor economics since Katz and Murphy (1992).10
that divides the two subperiods can be justified on two grounds. First, the
results ex post justify this division in that the two periods show remarkable
differences. Second, 1995 was the year when a major stabilization program
was introduced, which included fiscal restrictions, changes in monetary
policy, and privatization of banks ant public utilities to foreign strategic
investors. Quite naturally, the results of the analysis are very similar if one
splits the sample with one or two years away.
Table 1 contains the results and Table A1 in the appendix the summary
statistics.
9 If we look at the whole period, the results are insignificant in
general (and they are also sensitive to weighting). On the other hand, in the
two subperiods separately, the qualitative results are conclusive (and ro-
bust to weighting). Relative employment and relative wages comoved
strongly until 1995, while changes in employment were not related to
wages after 1995. According to the bias-corrected estimates, between 1986
and 1995, a one per cent change in relative wages corresponds to a 3-5 per
cent change in relative employment on average, with a larger response for
women. After 1995, however, changes in relative wages became unrelated
to changes in relative employment on average and also for both genders.
Recall that the two different periods experienced an opposite trend in
employment. What we have in the first period is a sharp fall in the em-
ployment of the less skilled and a small or zero decrease in the employ-
ment of the skilled, accompanied by a steady increase in the relative price
of skill. The second period experienced a further increase in the skill pre-
mium and a slow employment growth of all education groups. Together
with the especially high growth rate of the skill premium after 1995 (Fig-
ure 3), this indicates increasing demand for college-educated labor force
and inelastic supply.
2.4 The content of increasing demand for educated labor and responses
in long-run supply
Transition had dramatically different effect on the different cohorts. In
general, labor market experience accumulated (or degrees earned) through
                                           
9 Estimates for the non-governmental sector (outside public administration, health, and
education) gave qualitatively the same results and are not shown here. Standard error
estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity and residual serial correlation. Observations
were weighted by share in total employment; unweighted results are basically the
same.11
the years of socialism devaluated substantially after 1990. Along with in-
creasing returns to education, the devaluation of labor market experience is
a general result from Mincer-type cross-sectional wage equations run on
transition labor market data.
10 An important consequence is that the wage
disadvantage of young people relative to older cohorts has diminished
throughout the whole period. The trend has been the most pronounced
among the highest educated. Figure 4 shows the significant increase in the
wage of the college-educated 25–29 old and 30–34 old relative to the col-
lege-educated 40–54 old. All improved their position compared to the
middle aged during the whole time period (except for 30–34 year-old of
women until the mid-1990’s), and these trends accelerated after 1995.
Since the majority of the 30–34 years old in the second half of the
1990’s started and even finished university before 1990, these results sug-
gest that it is socialist labor market experience rather than socialist educa-
tion that lost from its value for the older cohorts. On the other hand, the
steeper rise for the 25–29 years old together with the acceleration of the
wages of the 30-34 years old in the late 1990’s might reflect that markets
do value post-socialist university education more. At this point, I leave this
question open for further research.
As we concluded before, increasing demand for educated labor after
1995 met an inelastic supply in the short run. The same conclusion holds if
we look at younger cohorts only. A regression on year-to-year changes of
aggregate wages on year-to-year changes of employment of the form of
equation (1) for the 20–29 years old gives a reduced-form elasticity of 4,9
(2,4) for 1987–1994 and 0,28 (0,74) for 1995–1999. In the long run, how-
ever, supply is expected to adjust as an increasing number of young people
choose higher levels of education.
Figure 5 shows that that is exactly what have been happening in Hun-
gary. Enrollment rates in the high-school and college ages started to rise
right after 1989, from 56 per cent for the 15–19 and 9 per cent for the 20–
24 years old, to 85 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively, by 1999. Enroll-
ment rates of those in their late 20s have increased as well. All this hap-
pened when the size of these age groups actually increased (except the 15–
19 old in the late 1990’s). Kertesi and Köllő (2001a) present more direct
evidence about this phenomenon: from administrative data, they estimate
that college inflow increased by 150 per cent between 1990 and 1999. Be-
sides the expansion of the Hungarian educational institutions, an increase
                                           
10 See Kézdi and Köllő (1999) for a survey of this aspect of the transition literature and
a deeper examination of the problem in Hungary.12
demand for education is obviously responsible for the trends. The families
realized that education matters more, and they started to behave accord-
ingly.
3. Industrial reallocation and skill upgrading
3.1 Overview
Net job destruction in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing was enor-
mous. In 1987, more than 55 per cent of all people were employed in agri-
culture, mining, and manufacturing. By 1999, that fraction decreased to 35
per cent. Agriculture and food manufacturing destroyed 60 per cent of its
jobs; employment in mining fell by 80 per cent, and by 40 per cent in
manufacturing. Employment in metals industries fell by 73 per cent, while
textiles, paper and publishing, and machinery experienced the least severe
losses. Machinery is the only branch of manufacturing that has been a net
job creator since 1995, with a 25 per cent increase to 1999.
A nontrivial part of people who lost their jobs in the above mentioned
sectors found employment elsewhere. Employment increased in most other
sectors from the very beginning of the transition, with the exception of
transportation, research, and culture. In terms of absolute numbers, trade,
hotels and restaurants produced the highest employment growth. Employ-
ment in public administration, health, and education grew a little until
1995 and has slightly declined since.
Industries with falling employment had used a high fraction of unskilled
workers. Same is true, however, for a few job creators, notably the trade
and most service industries. In terms of numbers, the major reallocation of
employment took place between unskilled industries between 1987 and
1999. On the other hand, by the end of the 1990s, skill-intensive industries
outside direct government control have produced the most spectacular
growth. Capital-intensive sectors shrunk the most in the first period but no
such relationship remained to the second period except for the exceptional
increase of two low-capital but high-skill industries, computer software
and “other business”. At the same time, earnings of the college educated by
industry grew more or less independently of the change in their share in
employment. A notable exception is their relationship between foreign
ownership. Inflow of foreign capital is positively correlated with increas-13
ing demand for skill, both in terms of fraction in employment and relative
wages.
The picture is, therefore, rather complex. On one hand, the major real-
location of employment in the first phase of transition occurred between
low-skilled industries and away from capital-intensive sectors. This sug-
gests major shifts in industry-specific labor demand that are not directly
related to skill. On the other hand, virtually all industries have gone
through a major skill upgrade and increased returns to skill. Growth in the
fraction of skilled employment has been uncorrelated with growth in re-
turns to skill, for reasons not clear yet. At the same time, increasing de-
mand for skill was positively correlated with the inflow of foreign capital.
These phenomena suggest not only a major and pervasive increase in the
demand for skill but also industry-related shifts in the demand for skill and
imperfect substitutability of skill between industries.
3.2 Within and between industry components of the changing skill
composition
In order to disentangle the importance of within and between-industry
shifts of the demand for skill, in this section I look at simple industrial de-
compositions of changes in the fraction of skilled labor. The decomposi-
tion looks at whether within or between-industry changes dominated the
trends. Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998) decompose the fraction of
skilled manufacturing employees for developed countries in the 1980’s,
which fraction increased on average everywhere. Their motivation is to see
whether skill upgrading was pervasive in all industries. They find domi-
nance of within-industry skill upgrading and they interpret it as evidence
for pervasive skill-biased technological change and against the role of
changes in the pattern of international trade. The former explanation is
then further supported by the fact that the same branches of manufacturing
increased the fraction of skilled labor in the different countries. Comparing
their results to the Hungarian experience would shed light on to what ex-
tent transition could be thought of as a special case of worldwide pervasive
skill-biased technological change versus inter-sectoral reallocation of em-
ployment due to other factors.
11 For technological change to be dominant
                                           
11 Dramatic changes in international trade could be an important source of changing
demand for industrial composition of output and therefore of labor input.
Deregulation of prices could be another such factor.14
transition industries have to acquire up-to-date technology. Also, the skill
structure of the socialist industries should have been no systematically dif-
ferent from that of the developed economies before the 1980’s.
The decomposition isolates changes in the overall fraction of skilled
workers into two components: the effect of shift of employment between
industries and average skill upgrading within all industries. Let L denote
employment, which consists of skilled (S) and unskilled (U) workers. Let
lower case s denote the fraction of skilled. Index j denotes industry, t de-
notes time.
















Then, the change in the fraction skilled can be decomposed to a within
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Table 2 presents the estimates for the average yearly between and
within changes of the fraction of college-educated employees, in Hungary,
in percentage points.
12 The first and second period of transition (before and
after 1995) are analyzed separately. The modern standard of industrial
classification (NACE) was introduced in 1992 so the beginning of the tran-
sition can be analyzed only by broader industry (see the previous section).
The table shows results for the whole Hungarian economy and separately
for manufacturing.
The results indicate that economy-wide skill upgrading was primarily a
result of inter-sectoral reallocation of employment in first period of the
                                           
12 Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998) look at the fraction of nonproduction workers.
Skill upgrading is defined here as an increase in the fraction of college-educated
workers because education is probably a better measure of skill than the production-
nonproduction worker distinction but Berman et al. did not have that information
available. The share of within-industry changes in Hungary is very similar whether
one looks at people with 12 grades or more, or nonproduction workers.15
transition but within-industry changes dominated the second period.
Moreover, within changes were stronger in manufacturing even the first
period.
The first period of transition was characterized by inter-sectoral reallo-
cation of labor that favored skill-intensive industries. Earlier results show
that the first period has also seen a large-scale reallocation between un-
skilled industries. The collapse of the socialist system probably changed
many things that affected labor demand. It is, therefore, not surprising that
changes in the skill-composition of employment cannot be explained sim-
ply by technological change. On the other hand, trends in the second pe-
riod can be thought of as results of a pervasive skill-biased technological
change that affected all Hungarian industries. Moreover, inter-industry re-
allocation of labor did not dominate skill upgrading in manufacturing even
in the first period. Therefore, the pervasive technological change analogy
seems to be valid in the case of manufacturing throughout the whole tran-
sition.
On the other hand, looking at which industries experienced larger skill
upgrade than the others invokes caution against the simple technological
change interpretation. Comparing the Hungarian experience to trends in
the developed world for the 1970–80 and 1980–90 time periods reveals
that if anything, there is a weak negative correlation between industry-
specific changes in the skill composition.
13 For example, machinery, elec-
tronic machinery, printing and publishing, and transportation equipments
are on the top of the international list but are among the zero skill upgrade
industries in Hungary. At the other extreme, petrol refinery, paper prod-
ucts, and tobacco top the Hungarian list but are at the bottom in the devel-
oped world. Two reasons may be responsible for this. First, new technol-
ogy introduced in Hungary may be different from new technology in the
developed world. Second, the initial structure of the Hungarian economy
might have been very different from the initial (pre-1970s) structure of the
developed world.
14
                                           
13 Berman at al. publish the average within-industry changes in the fraction of
nonproduction workers for the 9 developed countries they examine. The zero or weak
negative correlation with the Hungarian changes holds regardless of time period and
the definition of skilled workforce.
14 It may seem that another possible explanation is that the Hungarian analysis looks at a
short time period when supply of skilled labor was fixed within the economy (see the
previous sections). Changes in quantities, therefore, are not the best measures of
changes in demand. Examining industry-specific wage dynamics might be more
fruitful. As we have seen, however, the largest increase in the wage premium took16
4. Skill premium and firm and industry characteristics
We can get more insight into why the skill premium has changed over time
if we relate it to measured firm and industry characteristics. In order to do
that I combined individual earnings data with firm and industry level data.
In particular, I have estimated individual earnings functions with firm and
industry level variables interacted with the employee’s skill level. For-
mally, for each available survey year, I have estimated the following two
equations on the firms sector (no public administration, health, education,
and cultural activities).
12 3 ln ' ' ' ijk k ijk jk ijk jk ijk ijk w s Fs Fx α ββ β γ ε =+ + +× + + , a                      (3)
12 3 4 5 ln ' ' ' ' ' ijk k ijk jk ijk jk k ijk k ijk ijk ws F s F I s I x α ββ β β β γ ε =+ + +× + +× + +  (4)
i denotes the individual, j the firm, and k is the index of industry (3-
digit SIC). w is after-tax total yearly earnings adjusted for inflation; s is a
measure of skill of the individual, while x contains other individual char-
acteristics (gender, potential labor market experience, its square, and a bi-
nary variable indicating 60 years old or older). For keeping things simple,
the only measure of skill I present estimates for is college education.
15 F is
a vector of firm characteristics, and I is a vector of industry characteristics,
and both enter the equations interacted with the individual skill variable.
The two equations were estimated separately because the industry level
variables are available only for years 1992–1998 (except for 1996), while
most firm level variables are available throughout the whole period.
The parameters of major interest are the interaction coefficients, β 3 and
β 5. They show how the extra earnings advantage of the college educated
over the other employees is related to the particular firm or industry vari-
able, on top of the economy-wide college wage premium β 1. (To be more
precise, the interpretation of β 1 is the wage premium for firms and indus-
tries with zero values of all F and I variables.) The non-interacted firm and
industry coefficients β 2 and β 4 measure the earnings advantage of the non-
college educated in relation with the variables. The overall earnings ad-
vantage of the college educated that is related to the firm or industry level
variables is the sum of the pure and interaction parameters (β 2+β 3 and
                                                                                                                               
place in industries different from the most favored ones in the developed countries.
Therefore I do not pursue this explanation.
15 Results from alternative specifications are similar and are available upon request.17
β 4+β 5).  Tables 3 and 4 present the estimated coefficients from the two
equations, respectively, while Tables A2 and A3 show the summary statis-
tics.
One of the most important results is an increasing effect of the firms’
capital-labor ratio on the skill premium.
16 It is modest in magnitude: by the
end of the 1990s, a one percent increase in the capital-labor ratio raises the
earnings of the college-educated by 0.02 percent more than the earnings of
the rest. This effect is however significant, robust to inclusion of industry-
level variables, and shows a rather steady increase from around zero (Table
3). The trend of the overall wage advantage of employees in capital-
intensive firms is the mirror image of that of the skill premium. Starting
from a statistically significant positive value, it has gradually decreased to
zero. This tells us that capital-intensive firms offered higher wages to eve-
rybody in the late 1980s, but only the most educated were able to keep this
advantage. One interpretation of this phenomenon is a decreasing comple-
mentarity of capital and unskilled labor and an increasing capital-skill
complementarity. Using a more structural approach, Kertesi and Köllő
(2001b) arrive to a similar conclusion about the dynamics (though not the
levels). On a subsample of large firms, they estimate elasticities of substi-
tution between young skilled, older skilled, and unskilled labor, and capital
(also known as Hicks-Allen elasticities). Their estimates suggest that
capital and labor had been substitutes for all types of labor before the tran-
sition, but skilled labor has become largely independent of capital by 1999.
These are clearly at odds with my interpretation of the estimated positive
reduced-form coefficients, although those estimates are not large in mag-
nitude, either. In any case, the trends are the same: skilled labor had be-
come more complementary to (less substitutable for) capital.
17
                                           
16 Note that the equations control for firm size so that variation in the ratio reflects
variation in capital when everything else is held constant. Firm size is number of
employees, and it is controlled in a nonlinear fashion. Adding linear employment to
the equation does not change the coefficient on the capital-labor ratio.
17 The interpretation of increasing capital-skill complementarity is not the only possible
one. Also note that it is based on variation in the level but not the price of capital, and
therefore it is not an appropriate measure of complementarity. On the other hand,
measuring the user cost of capital is extremely problematic in economies in
transition. As a result, identification through cross-sectional variation of some
measure of it is questionable.18
Labor productivity (GDP over employment) does not seem to be related
to the skill premium itself.
18 The estimated coefficients are either zero or
small negative, and always a lot smaller than the coefficient on the non-
interacted variable. There is a steady increase in earnings advantage as la-
bor productivity increases for everybody employed at the firm. By 1999,
that advantage has become not only statistically but also economically sig-
nificant: a one percent increase in labor productivity is associated with
more than one fifth of a percent advantage in terms of after tax earnings.
The results are robust across the two specifications. Average firm produc-
tivity seems to matter for everybody and the most educated don’t seem to
benefit more from it than others.
The ownership results are quite robust.
19 Employees of state-owned
firms have earned slightly more than those under domestic private owner-
ship in 1992 but increased their advantage to a significant 11 per cent by
1999. College-educated added further to that advantage in a way that par-
allels the overall increase, with virtually zero in 1992 but an additional 6
percent in 1999. Employees under dominant foreign ownership have had
their steady 10-13 per cent advantage throughout the 1990s. The skill pre-
mium on top of all this, on the other hand, has increased from 7 to almost
16 percent. The interpretation of the ownership results is probably com-
plex. State-owned firms probably operate under a soft budget constraint
that allows paying more for everybody. The highest educated employees
may have better bargaining power and that what the skill interaction
shows. If state ownership is more prevalent in less competitive sectors,
there is also excessive rent to be shared. This is indirectly supported by the
fact that both the overall advantage and the skill premium are smaller if we
control for the concentration level in the industry (Table 4).
Foreign ownership, on the other hand, is hardly associated with soft
budget constraints. Rent sharing does not seem to be an important part of
the picture either, since foreign ownership has the same effect if we hold
constant the concentration of the industry. One possible interpretation of
the results is that foreign ownership is associated with technology renewal.
                                           
18 As noted before, labor productivity is the (scaled) sum of capital’s share and total
factor productivity (TFP). Therefore, variation in labor productivity mostly reflects
variation in total factor productivity when both employment and the capital to labor
ratio is held constant. The interpretation of the coefficient, therefore, is probably
close to TFP, the more natural notion of productivity.
19 Ownership is not an issue for firms before 1990 since the overwhelming majority of
firms was owned by the state.19
New technology is more skill-intensive (the developed world has seen the
consequences of this from the early 1980s, see for example the Berman et
al. study), and it increases the marginal product of labor. Selection of the
best employees to foreign firms may be therefore substantial, on charac-
teristics that are not captured in the data.
20 Therefore the substantial earn-
ings advantage for everybody. Marginal product differences among the
highest educated may be the largest, and therefore selection among them
may be the strongest. Kertesi and Köllő (2001a) provide some direct evi-
dence in support of this interpretation. They analyze data from an EBRD
survey conducted in 2000 in order to study technological study and its im-
plications for labor demand.
21 The survey contains data from interviews
with managers. Questions about technological innovations and their labor
savings implications were asked, along with hiring preferences. Kertesi
and Köllő estimate that foreign firms prefer younger workers significantly
more than domestically owned firms, but this difference disappears when
technological innovations are held constant. We know that young skilled
employees earn a lot more these days compared to older skilled workers
than in the past, and that is possibly because they adapt more easily to new
technologies. Foreign firms prefer them for the reason they use newer
technology.
New capital is part of new technology. Although there are elements of
new technology that increase productivity without increasing the capital
stock, part of the growth of labor productivity should be due to capital in-
flow. The fact that capital – skill complementarity is estimated to be small,
if any, is therefore a puzzle. One possible explanation is that real value of
capital is measured with error, and measurement error makes regression
coefficients be biased toward zero. In that case, foreign ownership might
be a better proxy for the market value of capital than the book value. That
interpretation is obviously consistent with my results. Problem is that it is
not possible to check its validity with the data at hand. We have no good
information about how badly capital is measured, and its measurement er-
ror is probably not of a classical nature. Without additional data this ques-
tion remains open.
                                           
20 Kertesi and Köllő (2001a) show that an even more pronounced difference can be
found among the young and educated, which, according to the interpretation here,
corresponds to an even stronger selection among them.
21 They use the Hungarian subsample. Romanian and Russian firms were also
interviewed. See EBRD (2000).20
Firm size (measured in employment) was not very important before the
transition but became a very strong and monotonic predictor of overall
wages by 1999. Employees in small firms (11–20 people) earn 30 percent
less than those in medium firms (51–300 people), who, in turn, earn7 per-
cent less than employees in the largest firms (more than 3000 people). It is
very possible that these figures reflect measurement problems: smaller
firms may pay more in-kind or just out-of-the-books benefits in order to
avoid high taxes. Controlling for industrial concentration does not change
these figures, which also supports the measurement error interpretation.
Measurement problems are, however, hard to evaluate as discussed before,
and I do not attempt that here. On the other hand, the inverted U-shape of
the skill premium (college-educated earned 15–20% less in large and small
firms than in medium ones in 1999) remains a puzzle under that hypothe-
sis. The phenomenon has been around since the late 1980s and has become
slightly stronger since.
Industrial characteristics have modest and rather unstable association
with overall earnings advantages and the skill premium. Contract work
22 is
an exception although not a very important one (it is 1–2 percent of the ag-
gregate turnover, see Table A2).
23 Contract work in an industry has been
negatively associated with overall wages, with a decreasing disadvantage
from around 10 to 4 percent. The skill premium has followed a completely
opposite path from an imprecisely estimated 40% advantage in 1992 down
to 2% in 1999. Apparently, the highest educated could draw some rent in
those industries in the beginning but that opportunity has vanished. In
1992, concentration level in the industry has had a significant effect on
overall wages with less so for college educated. By 1999, however, those
rent opportunities has seemed to vanish, too. Remember though that state
ownership and industrial concentration seem to interact and increase over-
all wages together. Sectors that were not dominated by state owned firms,
however, industrial dominance does not seem to have a significant effect.
Share of export in revenues has a small and unstable association with over-
all wage level and the skill premium after controlling for foreign owner-
ship.
The results provide support for the role of technological innovation in
the skill premium through foreign ownership. The increasing overall effect
of firm productivity on wages was established, without significant rela-
                                           
22 Production is based on imported technologies and material and under foreign control
but without foreign ownership and capital inflow.
23 High standard errors also reflect the small magnitude of contract work.21
tionship to the skill premium. In addition, some week evidence was shown
for capital-skill complementarity. Measurement problems however seem to
undermine a more direct investigation.
5. Conclusion
A substantial increase in the demand for skill has dominated the Hungarian
labor market since the beginning of the transition. The first period of tran-
sition (1987–1995) experienced major net job destruction, while employ-
ment started to rebound in the second period. The bias toward skilled labor
has been steady through the two phases. In the first period, a major be-
tween-industry reallocation took place in terms of employment and also
skill intensity. The second period was dominated by a pervasive skill up-
grade in all non-governmental industries.
Increasing demand for skill met a fixed short-run supply in the late
1990s. In the long run, however, supply of skilled labor seems to be very
elastic. College enrollment increased substantially, which indicates a
strong feedback from the labor market to people’s schooling decision.
Although selection issues and the reduced-form nature of the analysis
does not permit causal inference, the result seem robust enough to make
some conclusions. Introduction of new technology and new capital are
among the most important factors behind increasing demand for skill. Di-
rect measurement of these effects is not feasible, but foreign ownership can
be used as a proxy for new technology and capital. Earnings at all skill
levels are significantly higher in those firms, which suggests strong selec-
tion on unobserved skill. These results are even stronger for the highest
educated. Together with the pervasive nature of the skill upgrading in all
industries, this suggests that increasing returns to skill in Hungary fit into
the worldwide trends of skill-biased technological change. On the other
hand, the largest increase in the demand for skill has taken place in differ-
ent industries than in the developed world. That suggests that either the
new technology is of a different nature in Hungary, or the initial conditions
were very different.
By the end of the 1990’s, the Hungarian labor market showed trends
that are remarkably similar to those in the developed world. Foreign capital
played a significant role in bringing those changes about. This suggests
that countries that will attract significant amount of foreign capital will
possibly make the transition in the labor markets in similar ways.22
An interesting question remains to be answered at the end. Is transition
over in Hungary, at least from a labor market perspective? According to
the definitions considered by Svejnar (2002), it probably is. Both labor
demand and labor supply shows features that are similar to those experi-
enced in most modern capitalist countries. At the same time, however,
older and low-educated people seem to fit less into the new situation. From
the viewpoint of social experience, therefore, it may take almost a whole
generation for the transition to be over.23
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APPENDIX
Estimating the measurement error bias due to survey estimates in the
first regression model (change in log relative employment rate re-
gressed on change in log relative wages)
Since both n and w are estimates from survey samples, the estimated β   is
biased toward zero. In this section, I estimate the bias. The assumption
throughout is that both n and w are prone to excess variation independent
of their true value, n* and w*, respectively. In our case, this is likely to be
the case since both are survey means, and the excess variation is due to
sampling error. Formally, we assume that
* WW it it it ξ =+ , ξ it  ~ i.i.d. with variance 
2
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The bias occurs because, while the covariance in the denominator equals
covariance of the true variables, the denominator is larger than the true
variance because of the excess variation.
To keep things simple, I derive the results wihtout weighting. The
weighted results are straightforward generalizations of the unweighted
ones, by using weighted means, variances, and covariances.
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using the unbiasedness of the covariance, which will be established later.
For each t, we have that26
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Let us forget about the last term. The covariance is positive and small, and
therefore this simplification will slightly overstate the bias. The two other
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Using the same tricks as before, it is fairly straightforward to show that
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The proof is left for the reader.
The bias
At the end of the day, we have that
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It is the right-hand side of this equality that is estimable since the true vari-
ables are unobserved. We can estimate the bias if we have an estimate for
2 σ ξ . Since the Wit are sample means per cell, a consistent estimator for their
sampling variance is the within-cell vraiance (Vari(Wit)) devided by the
sample size within the cell (ni). The average within-cell variance
(avg.Vari(Wit)) and average sample size (avg. ni) are going to be used as a
first-order approximation. Evidently, the denominator (of the right-hand
side expression) is known: it is the variance of the righ hand side variable
(Var(RHS)). The square of the average wage (Wtbar
2)is also known from
the sample (again, its overall mean Wbar
2 will be used for first-order ap-
proximation). The calculated bias estimates for the relevant equations are
shown in the next table:28
Table: Estimates for the Bias Factor of OLS. 1 = unbiased.
1986-1995 1995-1999 1986-1999
Weighted
Whole Sample ,68 ,46 ,26
Men ,64 ,44 ,27
Women ,63 ,53 ,33
Unweighted ,64 ,44 ,27
Whole Sample ,49 ,82 ,72
Men ,52 ,84 ,76
Women ,49 ,78 ,67
The bias is substantial because there is a lot of wage variation within cells,
and because the variance of the right-hand-side variable is small.29
Table 1.
Percentage change in relative employment corrseponding to one per-
cent change in relative wages: estimated reduced-form elasticities
(standard errors: small size italic)














Whole Sample 1,95 0,00 0,26 2,87 0,00 1,00
0,52 0,38 0,28 0,76 0,83 1,08
Men 1,86 0,00 0,34 2,91 0,00 1,26
0,54 0,22 0,16 0,84 0,50 0,59
Women 2,81 -0,51 0,06 4,46 -0,96 0,18
1,10 0,93 0,86 1,75 1,75 2,61
observations: yearly observations for age5 X gender X education3 cells
specification: dln(relative emp rate) = a + b*dln(relative wage)
weighted by share in employment30
Table 2.
Robust standard errors with arbitrary clustering in the cells
(i.e. allowing for any kind of heteroskedasticity












Yearly % change in employ-
ment
1987 1987 1987 1987–95 1995–99 1987–95
Agriculture, Food, Wood 21,5 4,7 0,3 -6,8 -1,1 -4,9
Mining 2,1 5,2 0,7 -8,1 -8,7 -8,3
Textiles, paper, pub. 7,2 3,9 0,2 -3,1 1,8 -1,4
Chemicals & petrol 2,8 10,1 1,0 -6,2 -1,7 -4,7
Non-metals manuf. 1,6 6,0 0,5 -7,1 -1,1 -5,1
Metals manufacturing 1,8 5,9 0,7 -8,3 -4,9 -7,2
Machinery 10,0 7,4 0,2 -5,8 6,2 -1,8
Electricity, gas, & water 4,2 7,7 1,6 -5,6 -1,6 -4,3
Construction 6,4 6,0 0,1 -3,9 4,2 -1,2
Trade, hotels, restaur. 10,3 7,0 0,2 1,6 3,8 2,3
Transportation 6,4 5,6 0,5 -3,1 -0,6 -2,2
Post and telecom. 1,4 7,8 0,6 1,1 -0,9 0,4
Financial act., insurance 2,6 12,8 1,0 2,2 -1,8 0,8
Computer software 0,3 45,1 0,4 -3,3 13,9 2,5
Other business services 1,3 28,2 0,1 4,5 12,3 7,1
Other services + n.e.c. 4,7 10,9 0,3 -5,8 -5,4 -5,7
Research and devel. 0,7 47,1 n.a. -8,1 -3,6 -6,6
Public admin., defense 4,5 27,1 n.a. 2,3 2,1 2,2
Education 5,7 52,9 n.a. 2,4 -2,2 0,9
Health and social work 3,9 20,7 n.a. 2,6 0,3 1,9
Recreation, culture 1,6 36,8 n.a. -0,8 -3,0 -1,6
TOTAL 100,0 11,8 n.a. -3,3 1,2 -1,831
Table 3.
Average yearly percentage point changes in the fraction
of college-educated workers, within and between industry
Total Between Within % within
1987–1995 0,47   0,33   0,14   30 % Hungary all,
broad industry 1995–1999 0,28 - 0,09   0,37 132 %
1992–1995 0,35   0,39 -0,04  -11 % Hungary all,
NACE2 1995–1999 0,28 - 0,10   0,38 136 %
1987–1995 0,20 - 0,03   0,23 115 % Hungarian manufacturing
*,
broad industry 1995–1999 0,18 - 0,03   0,21 137 %
1992–1995 0,09   0,02   0,07   78 % Hungarian manufacturing,
NACE2 1995–1999 0,11   0,00   0,11 100 %
* without food, beverages, and tobacco.32
Table A1.
Summary Statistics: Log change on relative
employment rate and log change of relative wages.







Whole Sample mean dln[(Li/Pi)/ (L/P)] -0,0161 -0,0227 -0,0201
std dln[(Li/Pi)/ (L/P)] 0,1176 0,2329 0,1953
mean dln[Wi/W] -0,0094 -0,0053 -0,0069
std dln[Wi/W] 0,0173 0,0331 0,0279
Men mean dln[(Li/Pi)/ (L/P)] -0,0214 0,0053 -0,0051
std dln[(Li/Pi)/ (L/P)] 0,0998 0,1369 0,1240
mean dln[Wi/W] -0,0155 -0,0010 -0,0067
std dln[Wi/W] 0,0168 0,0348 0,0299
Women mean dln[(Li/Pi)/ (L/P)] -0,0075 -0,0704 -0,0450
std dln[(Li/Pi)/ (L/P)] 0,1425 0,3344 0,2753
mean dln[Wi/W] -0,0021 -0,0105 -0,0071
std dln[Wi/W] 0,0151 0,0300 0,025433
Table A2.
Individual earnings equation estimates. College education interacted with firm-leve
variables (capital-labor ratio, labor productivity, firm size, and ownership).
Firms sector only. Hungary, 1986–1999. blank cells: not available
Standard errors in small size italic
1986 1989 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
ln(K/L) ×  college -0,0050,004 -0,0090,004 0,0150,004 0,0070,002 0,0120,003 0,0200,003 0,0210,003 0,0290,003
ln(K/L) 0,0260,002 0,0110,002 0,0180,001 0,0050,001 0,0090,001 0,0160,001 -0,0020,001 -0,0020,001
ln(gdp/L) ×  college -0,0230,005 -0,0070,005 -0,0050,005 0,0380,004 0,0090,004 -0,0100,005 0,0010,004 -0,0160,004
ln(gdp/L) 0,0710,002 0,0870,002 0,1060,002 0,0610,001 0,1220,002 0,1740,002 0,2020,002 0,2170,002
owner:state ×  college 0,0130,013 0,1010,010 0,0650,010 0,0890,012 0,0380,012 0,0650,012
owner:dom.private ×  college ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
owner:foreign ×  college 0,0710,017 0,1050,011 0,1270,009 0,1670,011 0,1170,010 0,1570,010
owner:state 0,0150,004 0,0200,004 0,0170,003 0,0510,004 0,0760,005 0,1130,004
owner:dom.private ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref,
owner:foreign 0,1370,006 0,1770,004 0,0850,003 0,1300,004 0,1020,004 0,1340,004
size: 11-20  ×  college -0,1270,014 -0,1810,014 -0,1700,016 -0,1660,014 -0,1040,014
size: 21-50 ×  college -0,0580,054 -0,1100,031 -0,0930,023 -0,0090,016 -0,0420,014 -0,1470,016 -0,0610,016 -0,0990,016 -0,1140,015
size: 51-300 ×  college 0,0340,010 0,0010,011 -0,0250,011 -0,0090,010 0,0020,010 0,0130,012 0,0350,013 0,0150,012 0,0220,012
size: 301-1000 ×  college ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
size: 1001-3000 ×  college -0,0350,008 -0,0740,009 -0,0620,011 -0,0630,013 -0,0330,012 -0,0880,014 -0,0500,015 -0,0610,013 -0,0610,014
size: 3001+ ×  college -0,1120,008 -0,1180,009 -0,1290,012 -0,1510,012 -0,1330,012 -0,1090,013 -0,1500,016 -0,1270,014 -0,1260,013
size: 11-20 -0,2030,005 -0,3260,005 -0,2830,006 -0,2990,005 -0,2810,005
size: 21-50 -0,0370,024 0,0280,013 -0,0290,008 -0,1260,006 -0,1620,005 -0,2480,006 -0,2250,006 -0,2450,006 -0,2590,006
size: 51-300 -0,0310,003 0,0050,004 -0,0400,004 -0,1060,004 -0,0790,003 -0,1280,004 -0,0770,004 -0,0870,004 -0,0930,004
size: 301-1000 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
size: 1001-3000 0,0200,003 0,0040,003 0,0450,004 0,0070,004 0,0210,004 0,0160,005 0,0360,005 0,0460,005 0,0440,005
size: 3001+ 0,0560,003 0,0270,003 0,0720,004 0,0680,005 0,0720,005 0,0600,005 0,0340,007 0,0740,006 0,0730,005
college 0,5370,010 0,6590,008 0,7000,014 0,6840,010 0,6130,009 0,8600,009 0,7110,012 0,7460,011 0,7430,012
additional variables not shown here: gender, 12 grades of education (0-11 grades: reference), potential labor market experience, its square,
age>=60 binary variable,  22 industry dummies.34
Table A3.
Summary statistics for the earnings equations. College education interacted with firm-leve variables
(capital-labor ratio, labor productivity, firm size, and ownership).
Firms sector only. Hungary, 1986-1999. blank cells: not available.
Means and Standard deviations
1986 1989 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
dep. var: ln(w) 9,156 0,398 9,0870,408 8,9650,433 8,9420,474 8,7880,462 8,661 0,528 8,7060,586 8,7090,58610,802
*0,614
*
ln(K/L) ×  college -0,116 0,467 -0,0970,433-0,0150,400 0,0040,838 0,0480,504 0,0840,568 0,1020,652 0,129 0,625
ln(K/L) -1,354 0,908 -1,0650,970-0,3661,226-0,2312,551 0,1311,408 0,3381,451 0,3811,720 0,592 1,479
ln(gdp/L) ×  college -0,137 0,481 -0,0950,365-0,0410,329 0,0310,427 0,0570,377 0,1180,493 0,1430,542 0,172 0,597
ln(gdp/L) -1,635 0,613 -1,1060,662-0,6720,856-0,0631,144 0,1160,882 0,5050,937 0,6720,938 0,814 0,958
owner:state ×  college 0,0730,260 0,0450,208 0,0230,149 0,0240,154 0,0180,132 0,022 0,147
owner:dom.private ×  college ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
owner:foreign ×  college 0,0120,109 0,0210,144 0,0430,202 0,0420,200 0,0490,215 0,049 0,216
owner:state 0,7760,417 0,4200,493 0,2640,441 0,2640,441 0,1840,387 0,218 0,413
owner:dom.private ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref,
owner:foreign 0,0850,278 0,1430,350 0,2820,450 0,2370,425 0,2670,442 0,265 0,441
size: 11-20  ×  college 0,0120,111 0,0180,133 0,0160,126 0,0190,138 0,022 0,146
size: 21-50 ×  college 0,000 0,020 0,0020,040 0,0040,064 0,0100,099 0,0120,107 0,0100,100 0,0140,118 0,0110,103 0,014 0,117
size: 51-300 ×  college 0,014 0,117 0,0200,140 0,0250,157 0,0440,205 0,0290,167 0,0300,171 0,0310,173 0,0310,174 0,032 0,175
size: 301-1000 ×  college ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref,
size: 1001-3000 ×  college 0,023 0,149 0,0240,152 0,0180,134 0,0150,123 0,0160,125 0,0170,128 0,0180,134 0,0200,138 0,017 0,129
size: 3001+ ×  college 0,025 0,155 0,0220,146 0,0260,159 0,0190,137 0,0210,144 0,0200,142 0,0220,146 0,0210,143 0,021 0,143
size: 11-20 0,0980,297 0,1420,349 0,1270,333 0,1560,363 0,175 0,380
size: 21-50 0,002 0,047 0,0090,094 0,0300,170 0,0770,266 0,0920,289 0,0840,278 0,1060,308 0,0850,280 0,112 0,315
size: 51-300 0,134 0,341 0,1950,396 0,2420,429 0,3930,488 0,2750,447 0,2690,443 0,2690,443 0,2620,440 0,254 0,436
size: 301-1000 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
size: 1001-3000 0,264 0,441 0,2610,439 0,1980,398 0,1370,344 0,1370,344 0,1430,350 0,1490,356 0,1400,347 0,116 0,321
size: 3001+ 0,298 0,457 0,2390,426 0,2500,433 0,1800,384 0,1850,388 0,1660,372 0,1670,373 0,1570,364 0,163 0,369
college 0,091 0,288 0,0950,294 0,0990,299 0,1100,313 0,1120,315 0,1160,320 0,1220,327 0,1250,330 0,129 0,335
* 1999 earnings are not adjusted for inflation. That does not affect the estimates because it is an additive term in logs ant therefore shows up
in the regression constant only. additional variables not shown here: gender, 12 grades of education (0-11 grades: reference), potential labor
market experience, its square, age>=60 binary variable,  22 industry dummies.35
Table A4.
Estimates of the individual earnings equations. College education interacted
with firm-leve variables (capital-labor ratio, labor productivity, firm size,
and ownership) and NACE3 industry-level variables (share of export
in revenues, share of contract-jobs in revenues, industry concentration
 by gdp). Firms sector ronly. Hungary, 1992–1998.
Standard errors in small size italic.
1992 1994 1995 1997 1998
ln(K/L) ×  college 0,005 0,004 0,007 0,002 0,011 0,003 0,020 0,004 0,019 0,003
ln(K/L) 0,023 0,001 0,004 0,001 0,008 0,001 0,016 0,001 -0,003 0,001
ln(gdp/L) ×  college -0,002 0,005 0,039 0,004 0,019 0,005 0,008 0,005 0,010 0,005
ln(gdp/L) 0,096 0,002 0,058 0,001 0,128 0,002 0,187 0,002 0,206 0,002
owner:state ×  college 0,016 0,013 0,087 0,010 0,066 0,010 0,092 0,013 0,020 0,012
owner:dom.private ×  college ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
owner:foreign ×  college 0,106 0,018 0,097 0,012 0,125 0,010 0,137 0,012 0,111 0,010
owner:state 0,005 0,004 0,017 0,004 0,011 0,003 0,049 0,004 0,076 0,005
owner:dom.private ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
owner:foreign 0,126 0,006 0,176 0,004 0,079 0,003 0,116 0,004 0,105 0,004
size: 11-20  ×  college -0,132 0,014 -0,173 0,016 -0,189 0,014
size: 21-50 ×  college -0,087 0,023 -0,037 0,016 -0,054 0,014 -0,077 0,016 -0,131 0,016
size: 51-300 ×  college -0,036 0,011 -0,024 0,011 -0,011 0,011 0,020 0,013 -0,020 0,012
size: 301-1000 ×  college ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
size: 1001-3000 ×  college -0,052 0,012 -0,077 0,013 -0,056 0,013 -0,049 0,016 -0,095 0,014
size: 3001+ ×  college -0,106 0,015 -0,156 0,015 -0,117 0,013 -0,141 0,018 -0,141 0,016
size: 11-20 -0,202 0,005 -0,280 0,006 -0,302 0,005
size: 21-50 -0,028 0,008 -0,126 0,006 -0,161 0,005 -0,221 0,006 -0,245 0,006
size: 51-300 -0,031 0,004 -0,105 0,004 -0,076 0,003 -0,073 0,004 -0,091 0,004
size: 301-1000 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
size: 1001-3000 0,031 0,004 0,003 0,004 0,021 0,004 0,037 0,005 0,044 0,005
size: 3001+ 0,036 0,005 0,075 0,005 0,072 0,005 0,037 0,007 0,085 0,006
(export/rev) ×  college -0,104 0,030 -0,085 0,026 0,010 0,022 0,076 0,023 -0,054 0,019
(export/rev) 0,198 0,012 -0,033 0,011 0,002 0,010 0,033 0,010 -0,024 0,010
(contract/rev) ×  college 0,429 0,216 0,137 0,072 0,161 0,092 0,063 0,075 0,017 0,073
(contract/rev) -0,110 0,048 -0,123 0,022 -0,026 0,024 -0,055 0,020 -0,044 0,018
concentration ×  college -0,039 0,017 -0,018 0,015 -0,049 0,015 -0,037 0,018 0,010 0,019
concentration 0,107 0,006 0,060 0,005 0,036 0,005 0,015 0,007 0,009 0,008
college 0,729 0,014 0,713 0,012 0,627 0,011 0,698 0,014 0,761 0,012
additional variables not shown here: gender, 12 grades of education (0-11 grades: reference), po-
tential labor market experience, its square, age>=60 binary variable,  22 industry dummies36
Table A5.
Summary statistics for earnings equations. College education interacted
with firm-leve variables (capital-labor ratio, labor productivity,
firm size, and ownership) and NACE3 industry-level variables
(share of export in revenues, share of contract-jobs in revenues,
industry concentration by gdp). Firms sector ronly. Hungary, 1992-1998
Means and Standard deviations
1992 1994 1995 1997 1998
dep.var: ln(w) 8,965 0,433 8,942 0,474 8,788 0,462 8,706 0,586 8,709 0,586
ln(K/L) ×  college -0,015 0,400 0,004 0,838 0,048 0,504 0,084 0,568 0,102 0,652
ln(K/L) -0,366 1,226 -0,231 2,551 0,131 1,408 0,338 1,451 0,381 1,720
ln(gdp/L) ×  college -0,041 0,329 0,031 0,427 0,057 0,377 0,118 0,493 0,143 0,542
ln(gdp/L) -0,672 0,856 -0,063 1,144 0,116 0,882 0,505 0,937 0,672 0,938
owner:state ×  college 0,073 0,260 0,045 0,208 0,023 0,149 0,024 0,154 0,018 0,132
owner:dom.private ×  college ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
owner:foreign ×  college 0,012 0,109 0,021 0,144 0,043 0,202 0,042 0,200 0,049 0,215
owner:state 0,776 0,417 0,420 0,493 0,264 0,441 0,264 0,441 0,184 0,387
owner:dom.private ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
owner:foreign 0,085 0,278 0,143 0,350 0,282 0,450 0,237 0,425 0,267 0,442
size: 11-20  ×  college 0,012 0,111 0,016 0,126 0,019 0,138
size: 21-50 ×  college 0,004 0,064 0,010 0,099 0,012 0,107 0,014 0,118 0,011 0,103
size: 51-300 ×  college 0,025 0,157 0,044 0,205 0,029 0,167 0,031 0,173 0,031 0,174
size: 301-1000 ×  college ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
size: 1001-3000 ×  college 0,018 0,134 0,015 0,123 0,016 0,125 0,018 0,134 0,020 0,138
size: 3001+ ×  college 0,026 0,159 0,019 0,137 0,021 0,144 0,022 0,146 0,021 0,143
size: 11-20 0,098 0,297 0,127 0,333 0,156 0,363
size: 21-50 0,030 0,170 0,077 0,266 0,092 0,289 0,106 0,308 0,085 0,280
size: 51-300 0,242 0,429 0,393 0,488 0,275 0,447 0,269 0,443 0,262 0,440
size: 301-1000 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
size: 1001-3000 0,198 0,398 0,137 0,344 0,137 0,344 0,149 0,356 0,140 0,347
size: 3001+ 0,250 0,433 0,180 0,384 0,185 0,388 0,167 0,373 0,157 0,364
(export/rev) ×  college 0,017 0,076 0,016 0,069 0,018 0,077 0,020 0,089 0,022 0,098
(export/rev) 0,182 0,183 0,161 0,168 0,182 0,186 0,192 0,216 0,201 0,239
(contract/rev) ×  college 0,000 0,008 0,001 0,018 0,004 0,666 0,001 0,019 0,001 0,017
(contract/rev) 0,005 0,026 0,010 0,062 0,022 1,247 0,009 0,072 0,006 0,071
concentration ×  college 0,038 0,155 0,042 0,160 0,043 0,162 0,045 0,162 0,046 0,162
concentration 0,435 0,332 0,428 0,325 0,430 0,318 0,404 0,312 0,371 0,287
college 0,099 0,299 0,110 0,313 0,112 0,315 0,122 0,327 0,125 0,330
additional variables not shown here: gender, 12 grades of education (0-11 grades: reference), po-
tential labor market experience, its square, age>=60 binary variable,  22 industry dummies.37
Figure 1.
Employment rate (employment over population) and self-employment rate
(non wage/salary employment over employment) in the three
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Figure 2.
Unemployment rate and nonparticipation rate in the three
education groups, among the 15–59 old. 1987–1999.
year
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Unemployment rate Nonparticipation rate38
Figure 3.
Relative Wages Among the 15–59 old (compared to average wage
in the year), by education and gender 1986–1999.
year
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Outside public administration, health, and education39
Figure 4.
Wage of the college-educated 25-29 and 30-34 years old over
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After-tax earnings of young college educated over middle-aged college educated
Figure 5.
School enrollment rates among the 15-19, 20-24,
and 25-29 years old in Hungary
year
 15-19 enrollment rate  20-24 enrollment rate
 25-29 enrollment rate
1985 1990 1995 2000
0
.5
1
School enrollment rates